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1 The role of law is to regulate interactions among the members of a given polity, and
between these members, their governments and their institutions. Parallel to the legal
acts that contribute to the evolution of society, be they parliamentary decisions, court
rulings or administrative orders, the law has developed a language of its own with its
concepts  and  procedural  rules.  In  the  context  of  judicial  review  involving  the  US
Supreme Court, interpretation is associated with the role of the Justices in deciding
which meaning to give to a constitutional clause in relation to a specific case within the
jurisdiction of the Court. Discussions concern points of doctrine, and there is no clear
consensus among jurists as to the origin of the meaning of the constitutional text, nor
do they all agree about the role the Supreme Court Justices should play in the process:
does meaning originate in the minds of the Founders? Is it only present in the words of
the  Constitution?  Should  judges  restrain  their  interpretive  powers  to  the  literal
elucidation  of  the  text,  or  should  they  rather  be  more  active  and  adapt  the
constitutional  text  to  current  social  criteria?  None  of  those  preoccupations  are  of
immediate concern to a philosopher of language. Even though meaning is a major issue,
the legal approach does not fit into the categories developed in the field of analytical
philosophy, which would rather focus its efforts on eliciting the emergence of meaning
as  the  result  of  interactions  between  a  reference,1 verbal  statements, 2 and  those
speakers involved in the speech act. But this is the arena in which those apparently
diverging interests can meet and interact.
2 The purpose of the present contribution is to provide an insight into the semantics of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution from
a  philosophical  viewpoint.  This  clause  has  been  at  the  root  of  many  controversies
among  jurists  and  those  directly  affected  by  the  Supreme  Court’s  decisions  in  the
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course of the United States’ constitutional history, because of its extraordinary and far-
reaching influence on society and politics. It goes as follows:
3 All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or  enforce  any law which shall  abridge the  privileges  or  immunities  of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws. (14th Amendment to the US Constitution, Section 1)
4 Since its aim is to prohibit discrimination by state action, the disputes have focused on
the meaning of equality among those under state jurisdiction. Since its ratification by
Congress in 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause has fostered a
variety of divisive issues, like the legality of racial segregation, of mixed race or single-
sex  marriage,  of  the  treatment  of  non-nationals,  of  affirmative  action  measures  in
education and contracting, to name but a few of the issues that were absent from the
congressional  debates that preceded the ratification of  the Amendment.  Due to the
normative nature of law, those issues not only concern legal interpretation itself, but
also people and groups sharing the same interests. Moreover, equality, in itself a very
broad concept to define, has been subject to so many different interpretations that the
Supreme  Court  has  often  found  itself  in  the  eye  of  social,  political  and  moral
controversy whenever it had to decide on equal protection issues, not to mention the
legal disputations its rulings have triggered in the world of legal scholars, let alone
among  the  Justices  themselves.  The  issue  that  will  be  discussed  in  the  present
contribution concerns the nature of  the language of the law in connection with its
interpretation,  with reference to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s  theory of  the language game
developed in his Philosophical  Investigations  (1958).  Many scholars have focused their
attention on one particular aspect of his work, namely “rule following” in connection
with the possibility of  attributing meaning to law and to the rules of  interpretation
(Markell 805-810, Finkelstein). Whether there is such a thing as “legal truth” has been
the subject of many academic discussions, notably between the Legal Realists and the
Critical  Legal  Scholars.  Both  currents  have  elaborated  contrasting  theories  on  the
relation between rules of interpretation and the law, which constitutes their verbal
reference.  The former have construed Wittgenstein’s treatment of  rule-following as
evidence that legal rules are fundamentally indeterminate (Arulanantham). The latter,
dubbed the Anti-Realist current, argue that Wittgenstein never stated that language
was indeterminate,  but that our assumptions about how it  operated were flawed at
best, or even nonsensical (Bix), and that Wittgenstein’s views do not fully apply to the
field of legal interpretation.
5 My argument offers a somewhat different perspective on the subject. I will argue that it
is possible to consider the language of law as what Wittgenstein calls a language game
(1958: 23)3 while contending that language being self-referential, the meaning of law
can find an extra-linguistic  reference  in  the  concept  of  time.  But  what  bridges  the
conceptual gap between the self-enclosed world of the language game and the world of
history lies in a property of language that has hitherto been neglected: its metaphoric
aspect.  If,  indeed,  the  meaning  of  legal  interpretation  can  be  approached  via  the
exploration of  its  grammar,  its  rules,  that  have produced contrasted and sometimes
ambiguous results as expressed in the Court’s decisions involving the Equal Protection
Clause, some interpretations cannot be fully understood without taking the creativity
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of language into consideration. Because words do not point to a unique reference, and
because resorting to images and synonyms can bring additional knowledge about the
world thus designated (Frege),4 the language of law develops into linguistic variations
leading  to  the  creation  of  different  concepts  and  different  outcomes  within  the
compass of legal interpretation, the more so as the logical structure of reasoning is
based on analogy. The latter, in turn, operates on the grounds that elements from cases
can be used in other instances, but, ultimately, it can only refer to the constitutional
norm, which is based on an initial statement about the world as it is.
6 However, such a notion cannot be confined to a flat chronological backdrop against
which history unfolds, but should be seen as the substance that shapes the identity and
the memory of groups that have been differently affected by legal decisions, and judges
are  part  of  that  very  process.  More  specifically,  our  aim  is  to  show  how  the
constitutional clause, as interpreted by the US Supreme Court, is structured in relation
to the two following aspects: first, its meaning and how it emerges from the statement
made by the clause and, secondly, its complex relation with time, a concept that covers
several dimensions, such as history, memory, or hermeneutics. In that perspective we
will  follow the  detailed study conducted by French philosopher  Paul  Ricœur (1975,
1983,  1985).  The  meaning  of  legal  interpretation  can  also  be  approached  via  the
exploration  of,  in  Wittgenstein’s  words,  its  grammar  and  rules.  For  the  sake  of
consistency,  the  analysis  will  be  confined  to  the  issue  of  racial  segregation,  with
particular emphasis on cases such as Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), Brown v. Board. of Education
of Topeka (1954) and Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978).
 
I. Structure of the language game
1. Definition of “rule” and “reference”
7 The  piecemeal  definition  given  by  Wittgenstein  of  language  games is  rather
disconcerting  at  first  because  he  devotes  many  paragraphs  to  the  impossibility  of
anyone knowing what the expression actually means,  since it  cannot be reduced to
what  is  normally  referred  to  as  concepts;  this  indeterminacy  encompasses  all  the
constitutive elements of the language game, including rules, common understanding of
those rules among the players, intended meaning, and the very idea of meaning itself, as
exemplified in the following extracts: “How should we explain to someone what a game
is? […] We do not know the boundaries because none have been drawn. To repeat, we
can draw a boundary—for a special purpose. Does it  take that to make the concept
usable? Not at all” (1958 33)—he also insists on the inadequacy of logical categories in
defining games (ibid. 33, 34, 35). On language, he states:
You talk about all sorts of language games, but have nowhere said what the essence
of a language-game, hence of language, is: what is common to all these activities,
and what  makes  them into  language or  parts  of  language […]  And this  is  true.
Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying
that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same
word for all (ibid. 31).
8 He then proceeds to give a paradoxical definition of rules:
What do I call “the rule by which he proceeds”? —The hypothesis that satisfactorily
describes his use of words, which we observe; or the rules which he looks up when
he uses signs; or the one which he gives us in reply if we ask him what his rule is? —
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But what if observation does not enable us to see any clear rule, and the question
brings none to light? […] What meaning is the expression “the rule by which he
proceeds” supposed to have left to it here? (ibid. 38. )5
9 Of the common understanding of rules he says:
But what does the picture of a leaf look like when it does not show us any particular
shape, but what is common to all shapes of leaf? Which shape is the ‘sample in my
mind’ of the colour green—the sample of what is common to all shades of green?
(ibid. 34)
Must I know whether I understand a word? Don’t I also sometimes imagine myself
to understand a word […] and then realize that I did not understand it? (ibid. 39)
The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and
that then when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. […]
It throws light on our concept of meaning6 something. For in those cases things turn
out otherwise than we had meant, foreseen. That is just what we say when, for
example, a contradiction appears: ‘I didn’t mean it like that’ (ibid. 50; see also id. at
39, 53 and 54).
10 This state of utter uncertainty regarding the rules that govern the conduct of speakers
stands  in  jarring  contrast  with  the  requirements  of  legal  adjudication  and
constitutional interpretation, where the predictability of court decisions and the clarity
of rule-following are essential. In fact, language use is made up of an infinite number of
language  games  and  rule-following  is  synonymous  with  experience.  Legal
interpretation derives from a careful examination of case law, of precedents, and this
close scrutiny yields two conclusions: first,  that it forms a cohesive continuum and,
secondly, that there is a substantive congruence between the constitutional text and
the overall  series  of  derived decisions,  something that  Ronald Dworkin dubbed the
chain  novel qualified  by  the  criterion  of  fit (229-32) 7.  In  this  language  game,  the
reference,  that  which attributes a  truth value to  a  statement,  is  not  situated in an
extra-linguistic reality, and no real life, concrete fact will be the measure of its truth or
falsity; in fact,  the ultimate reference is verbal,  because it  is the constitutional text
itself.  Since  Marbury  v.  Madison was  decided  in  1803, 8 the  Constitution  has  been
considered as the supreme law of the land as far as the duty of courts in matters of
judicial  review  is  concerned.  The  logical  consequence  of  that  statement  is  that
constitutional  adjudication only  addresses  two questions,  the  first  one being “what
does that text mean?” (Kay 706), and the second: “how does it mean it?”
11 As  a  preamble,  let  us  make  two  remarks:  first,  the  reference  in  the  interpretive
language  game  being  textual,  and  not  factual,  there  is  no  reason  why  the  Equal
Protection Clause should not be considered on a par with texts of a different kind. After
all, a textual commentary can only be carried out on the assumption that there is a
common,  reasonable  agreement  on  the  meaning  of  its  words  and  sentences  (Fiss
742-43),9 albeit admitting a leeway in the manner in which meaning is to be assessed.
This leads us to the second remark, namely that language exceeds explication, which
can only be inadequate and mediate if  we follow Wittgenstein when he argues that
meaning is experienced more in language use than in conceptualization. Thus, theories
that aim to assign meaning to a particular location are doomed to fail. If one adopts the
mentalist’s view of the original intent as the source and location of the meaning of the
Equal  Protection  Clause,  we  negate  the  possibility  for  the  Constitution  to  mean
anything outside this specific context of utterance. One might wonder what relevance
it  would  have  centuries  after  its  ratification,  because  one  effect  would  be  to  deny
History any power and influence over societies. Besides, the Founders themselves never
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laid  out  a  particular  rule  that  would  govern  the  interpretive  conduct  of  judges.
Likewise, it is far from certain that rules of interpretation that focus on the meaning of
words avoid such pitfalls. Constitutional meaning can be seen as continuous because it
has acquired a time-honored definition through history, or affirmed with reference to
what dictionaries or thesauruses have determined it should be. Additionally, making
social or historical context the sole criterion in matters of interpretation would restore
the correlation between objects of the world and language: if that was completely the
case, then why would the constitutional text be the source of all interpretations, if it
was not endowed with some permanent meaning of its own? That is the reason why
Wittgenstein would say that there is no such thing as a fixed rule, because “we make
rules as we go along” (1958: 38)10 and that ascribing meaning by referring to another
word, and not to a fact, only demonstrates the arbitrariness of the process, and this is
logically nonsensical (ibid. 7). He did stress that rules exist, but that they do not follow
the logical  pattern ascribed to  them because  these  are  mere reconstructions,  mere
fictions. However, there is no reason to doubt the existence of rules, and of meaning;
but  they  rarely  take  the  well-trodden  paths  described  by  philosophers.  In  fact,
intellectual categories have rather obscured the issue, by separating and labeling texts
according to type or subject-matter, as was recommended by Aristotle. These were the
earliest examples of this theory of language.
12 One  particular  feature  of  this  classification  is  to  restrict  linguistic  structures  and
figures of speech to specific domains, like seeing metaphor as restricted to the domain
of literature. Roman Jakobson attributes six functions to language (62) and, according
to him, metaphor expresses the way in which language is used for its own sake and for
aesthetic  purposes.  But  it  can  be  equally  considered  as  cognitive  and  informative.
Frege, albeit in a theory that equates logic with perfection in language, admits that the
planet Venus can be equally designated by the expressions “Morning Star” or “Evening
Star”:  the  reference  remains  identical  (the  planet),  and  is  semantic  in  nature,  but
meanings,  expressed  by  signs,  differ  from  each  other.  Yet,  it  is  not  impossible  to
designate different semantic contents with one given sign (or word) in different texts:
this is the case with the word person in the Equal Protection Clause, since it came to
mean  different  things,  based  on  what  can  be  called  the  metaphoric  substance  of
language. To illustrate this view, reference will be made to French philosopher Paul
Ricœur, who devoted an in-depth analysis to the metaphoric nature of language in La
Métaphore vive (1975), translated into English in 1977 as The Rule of Metaphor.11 One of
the central points developed in this opus is that metaphor is not just a linguistic tool
fulfilling a poetic or a rhetorical function in speech and discourse, but it is crucial in
the emergence of meaning, while redefining our concept of truth along other lines: it
should not be seen as partaking of  logical  coherence and empiric  verification only.
Language,  through what he calls  metaphoricity,  can effectively create a new facet of
reality that integrates a cognitive dimension distinct from reference to the objects and
states of affairs. Moving from the semiotic dimension of meaning and metaphor (the
one that only considers the word as the unit of meaning) to semantics (according to
which the meaning of metaphor encompasses the whole sentence) to hermeneutics (an
interpretation that attributes meaning to a metaphor sustained throughout a whole
text, be it fictional or philosophical), the metaphor transcends and creates reality and
cannot  be  dissociated  from the  thought  process.  Within  the  boundaries  of  a  given
language game, metaphoricity expands the possibilities of interpreting facts and textual
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references in a creative, yet normative manner, a process that may open perspectives
in the field of constitutional adjudication.
 
2. The metaphor of the “person”
13 This word is emblematic of the interpretive disputes that have arisen in connection
with the Equal Protection Clause, because the notion of corporate personhood was the
result of the gradual metaphorization of the language of law, which provides an insight
into the definition and scope of the Equal Protection Clause while allowing the creation
of applications of the term to other, subsidiary contexts (Ricœur 1975: 112-14). When
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, it was clear in the minds of those who pressed
for its  adoption that  a  person was a  natural  person and,  for  many of  them, that  the
Amendment aimed to protect the newly-freed slaves from future disenfranchisement.
Since  then,  several  appeals  have  been  heard  by  the  Supreme  Court  as  to  the
constitutionality  of  the  doctrine  of  corporate  personhood and  the  desirability  of
maintaining  corporations  under  state  legislative  control,  a  point  illustrated  in
Darthmouth  Coll.  v.  Woodward (1819)  where  the  Supreme Court  limited the  power  of
government to control corporations whose existence was “found” in the Constitution.
In Paul  v.  Virginia (1868)  the Court  ruled that  corporations were not  citizens under
Article IV, section 2 of the Constitution; in The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873) corporations
were  denied  the  protection  of  the  Civil  War  Amendments;  while  not  deciding  on
corporate personhood per se, the Court reaffirmed in 1877, in Munn v. Illinois (1877) and
later  in  the  Railroad  Tax  Cases (1882) 12 that  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  could  not
protect corporations from State law. The turning point was Santa Clara County v.  So.
Pacific  Railroad (1886)  when  the  Chief  Justice,  although  the  issue  did  not  concern
personhood, expressed his opinion in favor of granting it to corporations, which was
ruled constitutional in 1889 in Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad v. Beckwith. Not only has
corporate  personhood a  history  in  which  ideology  and  economic  interests  were
intermingled,  but it  also came to be accepted by the Court,  in connection with the
Fourteenth Amendment, because of the structure of corporations and its analogy with
individuals and citizens. The mechanism by which an entity acquires characteristics
and rights normally attributed to human beings consists in extracting features from
the  legal  semantic  field  of  the  natural  person and  analogically  applying  them  to
corporations (Ricœur 1975: 258). Metaphorically, corporations can be identified in the
same way as individuals, via documentation that follows similar paths and has similar
functions. If a corporation can be defined as property held in common by a group of
people while  forming a separate identity,  it  can live a  life of  its  own and is  free  to
interact with business partners and institutions by means of contracts, just as natural
persons  do.  The  latter  undergo  a  process  of  progressive  abstraction  of  their  most
fundamental  characteristics,  and thus become general  entities  that  can,  in turn,  be
associated with different semantic contents; the process is linguistic, not logical, and
this explains why meaning fluctuates with time and circumstances, without giving the
impression that some rule of consistency has ever been violated. Moreover, the legal
entity, which represents the common pursuit of a group of shareholders, is the semantic
image of that collectivity and comes to embody it  in the same way as a metonymy
would (ibid. 256). The convergence between metonymy (one element that designates
the whole)  and metaphor (the semantic  analogy that  keeps the structure together)
provides the linguistic and semantic foundation for judges to grant equal protection
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and other rights to corporations, even if the outcome is not always widely sustained.13
Wittgenstein would explain the convergence between natural and corporate persons as
the expression of a “family resemblance,” in which there is no clear boundary between
words and concepts, so that semantic glides actually occur and polysemy generates the
metaphor (1953: 32). But the semantic creativity of language is also sustained by the
manner in which courts build up doctrines and legal concepts, more particularly with
reference to binding precedents. Indeed, as the underlying logical structure is based on
analogy,  it  enables  judges  to  apply  some  findings  in  relation  to  a  specific  case  to
another instance, whose subject matter is unrelated in content, and similar in purpose.
Thus,  the  definition  and  scope  of  Equal  Protection  can  depart  from  its  originally
narrower ambit to encompass a much wider range of applications.
 
3. The analogical chain of interpretation
14 This  interpretive  path  is  provided  by  the  manner  in  which  specific  cases  can  be
generalized  to  whole  areas  of  the  law,  and  the  double  process  of  gradual  racial
segregation and, conversely, its progressive abolition in all its forms, is a case in point.
In Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), the question whether state legislation imposing segregated
facilities  in  public  transport  was  constitutional  was  decided,  among  other
considerations,  in  relation  to  precedents  involving  school  segregation  (544)  and
interracial  marriage  (545),  while  distinguishing  the  case  under  review  from  other
appeals directly concerning public means of conveyance, because the latter involved
interstate commerce (546) or a state ban on segregated transport (546). The only case
involving transport that the Court considered as a valid precedent differed in the facts
but shared the same legal issue (547). Thus the chain of reasoning hinges on both form
and content, but none of those features need belong to similar cases and circumstances;
what matters most is the way in which the Court reaches its decision, and if segregation
is constitutional for schools or marriage, it can be so for public transport. This narrow
path  nevertheless  provided  state  legislatures  with  the  power  to  generalize  racial
segregation to other areas of social life, based on the same principle of the chain of
analogies that support the metaphor of race. Likewise, in Bolling v. Sharpe (1954),  the
Court resorted to the same kind of device to reverse Plessy, when it stated that “(t)he
Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does not contain an
equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the
states. But the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive.” And, although Brown v. Board of
Education, decided on the same day, concerns racial segregation in state schools, Justice
Warren concluded on the analogy between both cases  by stating that  “it  would be
unthinkable  that  the same Constitution would impose a  lesser  duty on the Federal
Government.”  Many scholarly  disputes  have arisen as  to  the legal  solidity  of  those
arguments,  but these controversies illustrate another aspect of  legal  interpretation,
namely  that  rules  may  exist,  but  that  they  tend  not  to  produce  identical  results,
something that Wittgenstein expressed in one of his sporting metaphors: “but no more
are there any rules for how high one throws the ball in tennis, or how hard; yet tennis
is a game for all that and has rules too” (1958: 32).
15 What emerges from such considerations is that rules, which are part and parcel of the
interpretive language game, are subject to other influences, such as political opinions
or social and philosophical views that may explain the differences in results, as well as
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the plurality of opinions expressed in court decisions. There are instances in which
opposite viewpoints rest on the variations in meaning of a particularly important term,
which can yield diverging results, depending on which solution is adopted. Thus, in
Plessy, Justice Harlan, quoting Strauder v. West Virginia (1880), dissents from the majority
opinion on most points, and particularly emphasizes the semantic gap that separates
his understanding of equal protection from that of the other Justices’: “We also said:
‘The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary
implication of a positive immunity or right, most valuable to the colored race’” (Plessy
556, emphasis added). Whether or not necessity is involved in the process, it remains
that meaning, when attributed to a word or a noun or a name, is floating, while it does
not prevent propositions from being experienced as true or false, or the product of
experience from participating in the future definition of a concept (Wittgenstein, 1958,
36). Ultimately, there is no way to assess the abstract superiority of one argument over
another (Markell), which probably explains the persistence of controversies in matters
of  constitutional  adjudication  when  it  comes  to  Supreme  Court  rulings.  But  this
discussion should not be restricted to internal debates in interpretation; if meaning is
intrinsically  experienced,  then  the  social  dimension  of  Equal  Protection  cases  and
decisions  offers  the  perfect  ground for  the  confrontation  of  different  views  of  the
constitutional  language  game.  One  element  that  structures  and  differentiates  the
perceived  implications  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  by  the  various  social  actors
involved in the game is time in its hermeneutic dimension.14
 
II. The hermeneutic role of time in the adjudicative
language game
16 So far, we have come to the conclusion that what sustains the coherence of interpretive
rules in the legal language game is metaphoric in nature, which may explain why the
existence of logically-structured rules (which maintain the cohesion of the system) may
foster  creativity.  For  Ricœur,  metaphoricity  belongs  to  discourse,  which  is  the
expression of the opinions and feelings of a conscious subject who lives in time. The
paradox of time is that it is perceived as a whole, and yet, there is a clear dichotomy
between cosmic, calendar time and the time of perception and experience (which he
calls phenomenological time), and, within the latter, another rift between the past, the
present and the future in the conscience of the subject (Ricœur 1983: 21-65) or, more
aptly perhaps, the human being, endowed with existence. Making sense of this aporetic
structure  of  time  necessitates  the  creation  of  some  narrative  that  puts  time  and
experience  in  perspective:  telling  a  story  is  already  some  sort  of  explication  of
experience, of existence and of the essence of time. Ricœur focuses his analysis on the
relation between time and historical  narratives,  which he  then closely  connects  to
fiction. In both cases, time becomes the subject of the narrative; historians have long
believed that history consists in the logical construction of the past, with a view to
providing a probable explication of the course of past events in a predictive perspective
called the “nomologist approach” (Ricœur 1983: 204-05) while novelists provide us with
a  description  of  history,  as  well  as  with  a  specific,  non-neutral  viewpoint.  Both
standpoints are not,  however, incompatible,  because both tend to create narratives.
The historical narrative, in its relation to time, is an attempt to come to terms with
such issues as personal identity, finality and the meaning of existence. The narrative
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construction  of  history  resorts  to  three  types  of  features  (Ricœur  1985:  189):
cosmological  time  (the  movement  of  planets,  the  cycle  of  seasons),  calendar  time
(which  represents  the  succession  of  years  as  well  as  the  repetition  of  events  and
commemorations), and experienced time. On the other hand, the Self experiences its
existence in the presence of others who have a commonality of interests and share
some  common  features  (Ricœur  1985:  198-208).  Time  enables  humans  to  think  of
history in terms of continuity between past, present and future generations, a process
fueled  by  the  gradual  collection  of  archives,  documents  and  traces  (Ricœur  1985:
215-24). Such characteristics are applicable to all human groups and social activities,
among which one may count legal interpretation. But memory is also a matter of point
of view and perspective, and judicial review is also conditioned by history; this has
generated  conflicts,  especially  with  respect  to  the  Equal  Protection  Clause  for  two
reasons: first, because the manner in which the Court construes time differs from the
perception of the actors that are directly concerned by the ruling (i.e. the parties to the
case), and secondly, because the issues associated with the Fourteenth Amendment are
not only a matter of  law and legal  reasoning,  but of  justice,  which partakes of  the
sphere  of  ethics.  This  concept  refers  to  the  substantive  aspect  of  law and is  more
traditionally divided between corrective and distributive justice. These two elements
play  an  important  part  in  the  debate  over  affirmative  action,  as  illustrated  by  the
Supreme Court’s  decision in the Bakke case,  which also reflects on the hierarchy of
values in Equal Protection embodied by the three-tier scrutiny system that places race
as its leading and ambiguous paradigm.
 
1. The Supreme Court’s narrative of Equal Protection
17 In his Bakke opinion, Justice Powell recapitulates the position of the Supreme Court
regarding  the  meaning  of  Equal  Protection  and  its  relative  importance  within  the
interpretation  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  (291-99).  He  begins  with  a  historical
overview of “the perception of racial and ethnic distinctions,” which he deems “rooted
in our Nation’s constitutional and demographic history.” He then proceeds to construe
the Court’s view of the Fourteenth Amendment as changing, and the importance of the
Equal Protection Clause as varying in the course of US history for the benefit of the Due
Process Clause, a phenomenon mirrored in case law. He sees the fluctuation in meaning
and scope of the Amendment as the result of an antagonism between these two clauses,
one striving to protect “the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppression of
those who had formerly exercised dominion over him” (291), while the other one had
been repeatedly used to expand the meaning of property via the doctrine of so-called
“substantive due process” (291-92).15 Parallel to this legal dichotomy, which we may
assume  he  considers  to  be  an  error  (an  opinion  reflected  in  his  choice  of  words
“relegated,” “desuetude,” “displaced,” “genuine measure of  vitality”),  Justice Powell
develops his view that the demographic landscape of the United States had changed
(292), and that this is something that would justify a new consideration of the Equal
Protection Clause. His aim is to show that the original meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause has  been broadened to  include all  minorities  (292).16 But  his  reasoning goes
beyond the statement that the United States is a nation of immigrants that have equal
claims to the protection of minorities against state discrimination; he does away with
the very notion of majority by supporting the view that it  can be replaced with the
notion of group alliances against another, and underlines that such alliances may be
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circumstantial  and  changing,17 and  that  these  changes  depend  more  on  social
fluctuations than on deliberate policies. Having removed the racial sting against one
particular class of citizens from his analysis of the scope of Equal Protection, he then
moves on to argue that the Amendment, whose reach is universal (293),18 can only be
construed as applying to individuals,  not groups (296),19 by virtue of his fluctuating
majority theory. Accordingly, yielding to real, but circumstantial cases, would deprive
the Constitution of any coherent and universal application, which would run counter to
the very exercise of judicial  review (297).20 This line of interpretation reads like an
historical narrative of the nomological kind; it is descriptive of an interpretive process,
it  generalizes  cases  to  their  most  abstract  aspect  and  adopts  a  universal  vision  of
persons, citizens, individuals. These words point to a subtext that contains the essential
characteristics of human nature as ideals, in the same way that a mathematician would
deal with symbols. Similarly, groups are presented as the mere aggregation of persons
sharing  identical  interests  and  characteristics;  they  are  abstract,  anonymous,  and
contrast with individuals only to say that the law knows the latter, not the former.
Sociological changes are equated with demography, a reference that has an objective
value in the eye of the judge because it is a science, and any fluctuation in that domain
is an object, a fact in relation to which a proposition can say something descriptive,
according  to  Wittgenstein’s  Tractatus  Logico-Philosophicus. In  that  sense,  these
fluctuations mean something.21 In a world defined as “everything that is the case […]
the totality of facts, not things […] determined by the facts, and by these being all the
facts” (ibid. 31), the language of propositions makes sense if they adequately (that is, by
using the correct logical symbols) describe events and objects in the world of reference,
if they are analytical (or tautological) and thus, devoid of any cognitive content (ibid.
155); on the other hand, a language that would form pseudo-propositions, like most
ethical or philosophical propositions, would not make any sense, because it would refer
to language itself, not to facts or events: in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, there is no such
thing as meta-language (“Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” [ibid.
189]). However, a proposition can show what it cannot say, which is the case when it is
true,  and  this  includes  understanding,  as  well  as  anything  that  lies  beyond  the
boundaries  of  the  world;  saying  and  showing are  mutually  exclusive  even  if  they
somehow coexist  in propositions.  Thus the judgment in Bakke strives  to restrict  its
scope to following the rules of the legal language game, and rejects other sociological
or ethical considerations outside its boundaries. Wittgenstein states in a famous letter
to Ludwig von Ficker that the meaning of  his  Tractatus was ethical,  but that ethics
constituted its unwritten part (McGuinness 287; Engelmann 143-44). What is at stake in
the Bakke ruling is precisely the ethical issue of justice—indeed, this case evidences the
conflict between two language games. Opposite the language of law is the language
game  of  a  group,  a  community  that  has  been  shaped  by  history  as  well  as  by  a
collective,  shared memory around the central  paradigm of  racial  discrimination.  In
fact, in a manner similar to a Wittgensteinian proposition, the court ruling in Bakke
says something about the rules of the language game and shows how the paradigm of
race has deeply shaped the narrative of constitutional interpretation. It is particularly
clear in the manner in which the Court has devised a differential system of scrutiny in
relation to cases involving the Equal Protection Clause, which will be the focus of the
next part.
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2. The three-tiered standard of scrutiny
18 In  the  course  of  legal  interpretation,  the  Court’s  attitude  toward  government
discrimination  has  changed,  and  the  case  of  Carolene  Products  (1938)22 and  its  now
famous  “Footnote  4”  has  been  hailed  a  landmark  decision  in  that  respect.23 It
introduces  into  the  review  process  the  idea  that  there  are  different  types  of
discrimination, and that some, being more serious than others, would demand stronger
accountability of the legislature or government to justify it. The Footnote includes all
the provisions of the Bill of Rights in its scope, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment
within a stricter standard of scrutiny. Thus, any legislative decision that would, on its
face, treat groups differently on the basis of race should be considered unconstitutional
unless  the  government  justifies  its  action  by  proving  it  would  fulfill  the  aims  and
objectives of the Fourteenth Amendment. While it is easy to understand why the Court
has introduced a scale in the standards of judicial review, based on the impact and
objects of that scrutiny,  the question whether strict scrutiny applies to any case of
differential treatment on the basis of race is much more controversial, as the Bakke case
highlighted. The whole discussion hinges on the exact meaning of equality. In logic, the
[=] sign is equivalent to the copula is, and it can be understood in two ways. First, it is a
statement of existence, and it connects a subject (S) and a predicate (P), and this is the
general  form of  propositions that  describe objects  of  the world or  states of  affairs.
However,  propositions  can  also  be  analytic,  in  which  case  they  are  tautological,
identical, and do not contain any information about the world of reference; they only
describe themselves. On that basis, the [=] sign has no meaning of its own, but it has
implications in law because it is closely associated with theories in which justice plays a
central part. For the Court in Bakke, equality means that there should be no distinct
treatment of individuals on the basis of race; one individual shares the same feature
with  all  the  others,  and  that  entails  having  the  same  rights  that  are  equally  and
uniformly protected by the Constitution. We may call this an essentialist view. On this
basis,  the existence of minorities is contingent because their existence may fluctuate
with  time;  thus,  it  would  be  dangerous  to  attribute  to  one  (or  several)  group(s)  a
privileged status by means of discriminatory programs, because, if we take into account
the  possibility  of  future  demographic  changes,  that  group  may  itself  become  the
majority;  in  which  case  any  reparative  law  in  its  favour  might  turn  out  to  be
discriminatory against the past majority group. But if we adopt Ricœur’s opinion on the
importance  of  time  in  the  shaping  of  a  collective  memory,  we  clearly  find  that
communities  have  shaped  their  identity  around  preferential  or  discriminatory
treatment,  a  phenomenon that  is  well-documented in the case of  African-American
history. Time leaves traces that are remembered and transmitted from generation to
generation in such a way that pure equal treatment cannot be an appropriate response.
19 The idea that time is synonymous with progress is the direct heir to the Enlightenment,
a  view that  is  both  optimistic  and abstract.  Identity,  in  that  case,  is  rather  formal,
mathematical in its definition, and its semanticism is somehow merged with that of
equality, because the focus for interpretation is general and universal. If it negated the
existence of groups in the eye of the law, the Court’s view would run counter to history
and sociology while trying to come to terms with its consequences. According to social
science, identity is always shaped by the existence of antagonistic communities, an idea
which is reflected in the successive rulings that have helped define the paradigm of race
in the judicial arena. Indeed, major changes in the legal interpretation of “equality”
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have taken place since Plessy, and have mostly hinged on the idea of “togetherness” as
opposed to “separation,” but it is remarkable that the existence of groups has always
been present in the background. In Plessy, the Court contended that laws mandating
that the races be “separate but equal” was constitutional; in Brown, the doctrine was
reversed to races being considered as living “together and equal,” which, semantically,
comes much closer to the constitutional ideal of equality, while it does not address the
issue of the existence of groups and communities based on race, and how they should
interact within a constitutional framework that upholds equality. In Bakke, however,
there has been a shift in the definition of racial relations; individuals should compete
against one another for a place in higher education, regardless of color or origin, while
the promotion of hitherto minorities was considered as conforming to the purpose of
the Constitution (Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 438 US 265 1978: 314-316),
24 which is logically puzzling. One way of solving this paradox is to consider the Court’s
view as an attempt to dissociate the concept of race from that of group by stating that
race should be one factor to take into account in admissions to law or medical schools,
but only as one among a variety of criteria, that should equally apply to individuals.
Thus, it is possible to see the ruling as a contribution to the emergence of a color-blind
society that  would achieve the ideal  of  togetherness  enshrined in the Constitution.
However, resorting to strict scrutiny seems to underline the paradox of race, and its
paradigmatic  status  in  US  constitutional  history;  indeed,  it  restricts  the  impact  of
legislation in racial matters for historical reasons, while government may elect to take
strong incentive measures, like affirmative action, with the same aim, and for identical
reasons. Incidentally, if the Supreme Court’s view prevails over government-sponsored
affirmative action programs, it would, in the long term, prepare for the abandonment
of the three-tier standard of scrutiny, should the ideal of color-blindness be achieved. If
that was the case, it would demand a different approach to the interpretation of Equal
Protection, but this speculation remains entirely hypothetical for one essential reason:
the legal language game operates on its own terms, and it does not, or cannot, shape
the entire US society, because the latter is based on a strong feeling of community and
separate identities in terms of religion, culture, race and origin. Conversely, claiming
that  society  exerts  some controlling  influence  on  the  law is  equally  valid,  because
courts  do  take  context  into  account  when  adjudicating  a  case.  So,  the  reasonable
question to ask is not whether a law that gives equal opportunities to a racial group by
means of preferential treatment is required by fairness and justice, but whether it is
incompatible with it.
 
3. The “Mortal Question” of Equal Protection
20 The heading of  this  paragraph is  borrowed from philosopher Thomas Nagel,  whose
collection of essays, published under the title Mortal Questions (1979),25 discusses a series
of  ethical  issues,  including  the  issue  of  equality  in  chapters  7  (“The  Policy of
Preference”) and 8 (“Equality”). In his preface, Nagel sets the objective of his analysis:
Simplicity and elegance are never reasons to think that a philosophical theory is
true:  on  the  contrary,  they  are  usually  grounds  for  thinking  it  false.  Given  a
knockdown  argument  for  an  intuitively  unacceptable  conclusion,  one  should
assume there is  probably something wrong with the argument that  one cannot
detect—though  it  is  also  possible  that  the  source  of  the  intuition  has  been
misidentified. If arguments or systematic theoretical considerations lead to results
that seem intuitively not to make sense, or if a neat solution to a problem does not
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remove the conviction that some question is unreal leaves us still wanting to ask it,
then something is wrong with the argument and more work needs to be done. Often
the problem has to be reformulated, because an adequate answer to the original
formulation fails to make the sense of the problem disappear. (Nagel x-xi)
21 Accordingly, the ideal form of philosophy is investigative, its purpose is to strive to find
answers by asking relevant questions. In Nagel’s view, philosophy is an activity, just
like language in Wittgenstein’s opinion, but making sense of a problem can often be
summed  up  in  its  identification,  and  not  its  correct  (or  incorrect)  interpretation
(Wittgenstein 1953: 33), because it is extremely hazardous to establish what a true or a
false  statement  or  opinion  is.  When  applied  to  Equal  Protection  as  the  Court
interpreted it in Bakke, it is clear that the problem concerns not only the method, the
legal approach adopted by supporters and opponents of affirmative action policies, but
also the substance of the argument. In The Policy of  Preference,  Nagel chooses not to
discuss the legal aspect of the issue but its moral implications in terms of justice, an
area that overlaps and exceeds the scope of the judicial language game. The main issue
is  whether  or  not  preferential  treatment  in  favour  of  a  member  of  a  previously
discriminated community is fair and just, and articulating such an idea is the result of a
long,  non-linear  process  (Nagel  91).  It  begins  with the realisation that  institutional
discrimination is  unacceptable,  which generates  self-conscious  efforts  to  combat  it,
even if its existence is visible in many ways. That racial discrimination survives in spite
of the law shows that it has been internalized in the course of history and of social
development;  if  de  jure segregation  has  disappeared,  de  facto discrimination  is  still
visible among those who were formerly stigmatized by the law. Among those people,
distinctions should be made between the direct  victims of  discrimination and their
descendants, who may also feel that society does not treat them fairly on inherited
racial grounds. Nagel argues that society should examine the existence of perceived
discrimination,  especially  if  it  is  supported by statistics  and figures,  and determine
whether it is just the consequence of an otherwise liberal and unequal society, or if it is
the result of a deliberately unfair treatment of racial minorities (Nagel 93). One is left
with an alternative: either to decide that merit alone will determine access to socially
and financially attractive positions, or to tilt the balance in favor of the affected groups
and introduce a compensatory element by means of affirmative action programs. Then
again, depending on one’s opinion, this should lead to a discussion on the desirability of
such programs because a better representation of  minorities in higher education is
positive in terms of social utility and efficiency. Nagel then insists on the fact that this
is a question of opinion and deliberate choice, that there is nothing clear and evident
about it in terms of justice because the concept of justice itself is blurred. It is a matter
of perception, the workings of memory and the manner in which political ideology sets
its  standards and goals  for  what  it  considers  a  “just”  society (Nagel  97-99).  Having
described the logical conundrum of the policy of preference, and the impossibility of
deciding if  it  is  required by  justice,  Nagel  (101)  proceeds  to  examine whether  it  is
incompatible with it. Accordingly, upholding the differential treatment of minorities
with a view to giving equal opportunities to groups previously discriminated against
may create adverse effects on otherwise qualified members of the majority (which is
the issue in Bakke) but could be justified in terms of utility.26 If this ends up providing
better  access  to  health,  education and the law for  under-represented communities,
while  the  self-esteem  of  white  male  applicants  is  not  seriously  and  insidiously
endangered,  then  this  benefits  society  as  a  whole  (Nagel  103).  By  broadening  the
Is Equal Protection a Language Game?
Angles, 3 | 2016
13
perspective on equal protection, it becomes clear that the application of the rules of the
legal language game is justified within its boundaries, but not if we consider the social
fabric it has shaped in the course of history. Thus, interferences between overlapping
language games would be at the root of controversies in equal protection. Now the
question is to find a way of reconciling the apparent discordance that the notion of the
language game seems to convey. Indeed, for the sake of consistency in society and in the
legal system, there should be at least one common ground on which language games
emerge and add complexity to all issues of meaning and truth-value that would find its
justification in what binds humans together and conditions their social interaction. One
possibility would be to resort to what Wittgenstein called “forms of life.”
 
4. Equal Protection and the “Form of life”
22 If formal logic cannot provide any sustainable explanation for the diversity of concrete,
everyday situations  and their  correlated perception,27 there  is  at  least  one form of
experience  that  would  synthesize  it,  a  concept that  Wittgenstein  calls  Lebensform
(“form of life”)28. The word itself is not given a clear-cut definition; it refers to what
conditions reactions and capacities which are hard-wired in the human brain, as well as
to the social and cultural conventions that are the consequences of such capacities. For
Wittgenstein, the form of life is a framework for behaviour and conduct in which rules
are followed because this is the natural thing to do. Therefore, language emerges as a
coherent whole out of a stable and regular form of life,  and the infinite number of
language games that it generates can only be understood and followed in reference to
that form of life (Wittgenstein 1958: 86). Because the latter creates the conditions for a
social and intellectual consensus on the description of phenomena—language being the
most fundamental of them—it can be identified with the truth-value of propositional
logic except that it differs greatly in substance (ibid. 88). Applied to Equal Protection,
this statement means that language games are autonomous, they set up their rules in
such a way that they can be traced back to the form of life that has enabled them to
flourish. It may lead us to conclude that the conventional nature of the law is somehow
congenial to human nature itself, but also that it is engaged in a network of games that
influence  each  other  in  many  respects.  Thus,  the  ranking  of  relevant  criteria  in
constitutional adjudication can be the result of those interactions, which may vary with
time and circumstances. The predominance of rules of interpretation derives as much
from internal considerations (like methods and traditions) as from outside influences,
like political or social theories, or even history in the way it shapes collective memory.
The focus has therefore shifted from objective rule-following to accommodation with a
variety of experiences that have an equal claim to legitimacy. This analysis should give
coherence to the history of the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, while
underlining the impossibility  of  finding the most  adequate  judicial  response to  the
social problems entailed by racial discrimination. It can also be seen as an attempt to
dissolve  the  apparent  inconsistencies  that  have  accompanied  the  Supreme  Court
rulings  in  connection  with  this  thorny  issue,  and  one  remarkable  attempt  at
conciliating  the  requirements  of  law  and  of  justice  within  the  “form  of  life”  of
American society in its political dimension can be found in the decision of the Court of
Appeals  for  the Sixth Circuit  in Coalition  to  Defend Affirmative  Action v.  Regents  of  the
University of Michigan (2011). The issue concerns the constitutionality, under the Equal
Protection  Clause,  of  a  “successful  voter-initiated  amendment  to  the  Michigan
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constitution” prohibiting “Michigan’s public colleges and universities from granting,
according to the text of the amendment (Michigan Constitution, art.1, §26) ‘preferential
treatment to […] any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or
national origin.’” (§26(2)). The Appeal Court’s approach was to examine the facts in the
light of the fair political process of the Equal Protection Clause, which prevents state
governments from altering the political  structure of  the State in a  way that  would
impose an impermissible burden on minorities, by securing the vote of the majority in
matters that would, in all  likelihood, put them in an electorally-sanctioned unequal
position.  For the Court,  this  would amount to the perversion of  the very notion of
democracy. The Equal Protection Clause “guarantees racial minorities the right to full
participation in the political life of the community. It is beyond dispute [...] that given
racial or ethnic groups may not be denied the franchise, or precluded from entering
into the political process in a reliable and meaningful manner” Washington v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 458 US 457, 467, 102 S.Ct. 3187, 73 L.Ed.2d 896 (1982). But the Equal Protection
Clause reaches even further, prohibiting “a political structure that treats all individuals
as equals, yet more subtly distorts governmental processes in such a way as to place
special burdens on the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation. […]
The State may no more disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult
to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any person’s vote or give any group a
smaller representation than another of comparable size” Hunter v. Erickson, 393 US 385,
393, 89 S.Ct. 557, 21 L.Ed.2d 616 (1969).
23 The Supreme Court’s statements in Hunter and Seattle emphasize that equal protection
of the laws is more than a guarantee of equal treatment under existing law. It is also a
guarantee that minority groups may meaningfully participate in the process of creating
these laws and the majority may not manipulate the channels of change so as to place
unique  burdens  on  issues  of  importance  to  them.  In  effect,  the  political-process
doctrine hews to the unremarkable notion that when two competitors are running a
race, one may not require the other to run twice as far or to scale obstacles not present
in the first runner’s course. Ensuring the fairness of the political process is particularly
important  because  an  electoral  minority  is  disadvantaged  in  its  attempts  to  pass
legislation; this is especially true of “discrete and insular minorities,” who face unique
additional hurdles.29 This extract from the ruling echoes the words of President Lyndon
Johnson in his 1965 Commencement Address at Harvard University, in which he defines
affirmative action as the endeavor to give equal opportunities to racial minorities: “We
seek not just freedom but opportunity—not just legal equity but human ability—not just
equality as a right and a theory, but equality as a fact and as a result.” (Johnson, emphasis
added) What is even more remarkable is the manner in which the Court uses the same
famous metaphor of the two runners on the racetrack devised by Johnson to illustrate
the way in which centuries of racial discrimination have negatively affected minorities.
30 However,  whereas Lyndon Johnson clearly  alludes to  existing social injustice  that
affirmative action aims to combat, while political freedom is taken from granted,31 the
Sixth Circuit gives a detailed definition of equality within a democratic and political
framework (Coalition 619-25). Indeed the Civil Rights era motto of “One man, one vote”
which insists on the political equality among individuals in the political process, must be
supplemented by a thorough consideration of the place of groups in the voting process
in such a way as to qualify the preponderance and scope of a majority vote. In that
perspective, it is fallacious to argue that the sum of minority voters would exceed in
numbers the majority group,32 as the Equal Protection Clause speaks of the protection
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of insular groups. This remark points to the necessity to see equality as a multi-faceted
concept the dimensions of which must necessarily coexist in society. It can then be
reasonably asserted that the form of life spoken of by Wittgenstein is the converging
point of otherwise diverging language games, interests, and discourse. It constitutes
the environment that nurtures language games and their rules on the one hand, and
their  metaphoric  interactions that  are  shaped so  as  to  form “family  resemblances”
(Wittgenstein 1953: 32), on the other hand. Supreme Court rulings in matters of Equal




24 Behind  the  controversies  generated  by  the  Supreme  Court’s  attempts  at  giving  a
sustainable interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause lies a deeper quest for judicial
truth,  a  truth that seems to elude formal logic,  as  well  as  individual  and collective
experience. It cannot be equated to the sole narrative structure of judgments, and it
cannot dissolve the competing social claims that the constitutional text has embodied
and generated at  the same time.  The paradox of  truth lies in the fact  that it  is  an
absolute  necessity  envisaged  as  something  particular,  because  it  is  a  powerful  but
elusive ingredient of language. To ask whether legal interpretation is a linguistic fallacy
is not to deny this indissoluble connection between truth and language, but to state
that  it  does  not  stand  the  test  of  interpretation  without  highlighting  its  many
contradictions, diffractions and impossibilities. It may also open new perspectives in
the analysis of judicial discourse by focusing on the social shaping of legal concepts; the
latter can be envisaged as elements of a language game whose rules originate, not in
words themselves, and not in a unique connection with its external reference, but as
the  result  of  a  narrative,  metaphorical  and  over-inclusive  construction.  From  that
perspective, the language of law may be considered as a world in its own terms, yet
firmly anchored in its social environment. Such a view would highlight the normative
importance  of  legal  interpretation  while  showing  the  influences  to  which  it  is
subjected, which could validly generate competing claims that are worthy of future
consideration.
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NOTES
1. Reference is made up of all the contextual, extra-linguistic elements against which the contents
of a proposition will  be tested.  Its  role is  to attribute a truth-value to those propositions by
reference to an existing state-of-affairs.  For instance, the statement “John McCain is the 44th
President of the United States” is false by reference to the historical context we live in.
2. Verbal statements are not necessarily propositions. Commands or questions, for instance, are
not propositions. The latter are considered as the bearers of truth and falsity in connection with
reference, irrespective of the natural language used to express them.
3. “Here the term ‘language game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of
language is part of an activity, or a form of life […] It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of
the  tools  in  language  and of  the  ways  they  are  used,  the  multiplicity  of  kinds  of  word and
sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language” (Wittgenstein 1958: 24). 
4. The main point of his argument is  that real  objects (the reference) may be designated by
several signs (words, groups of words, verbal expressions) and their sense will thus differ from
one another (the planet Venus, which is visible from the Earth, is designated be the expressions
“Morning  Star”  or  “Evening  Star”;  different  designations  provide  different  meaning  and
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information about the reference, and it would be wrong to assume that Morning Star = Evening
Star in the same way as we may posit a=b).
5. Similar statements can be found at 26, 32, 39.
6. This word translates the German “meinen,” which clearly refers to what the speaker has in
mind when making a statement.
7. Fit, according to Dworkin, describes a harmonious relation between legal interpretation and
the law’s guiding principles.
8. 5 US 137 (1803) : “[I]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is […] So, if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution
apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law,
disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court
must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of
judicial duty. If then, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the constitution is superior to any
ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such an ordinary act, must govern the case
to which they both apply. Those, then, who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be
considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts
must close their eyes to the constitution, and see only the law. This doctrine would subvert the
very foundation of all written constitutions” (my emphasis).
9. “[T]he  Constitution  is  no  different  from  a  poem  or  any  legal  document.  Generality  and
comprehensiveness are features of any text. Though the Constitution may be more general and
comprehend more than a sonnet or a contract, it is comparable in this regard to an epic poem or
some national statures. […] It should also be understood that generality and comprehensiveness
do not discourage interpretation but are the very qualities that usually provoke it.”
10. See also Shawver (online). This paragraph suggests, according to her, that precision is not
always better than imprecision. Indeed, fixing meaning often results in its disappearance.
11. References are to the original French edition.
12. In San Mateo County v. S. Pacific R.R., 116 US 138 (1885), the argument that corporations were
“persons” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment was heard for the first time, even if
the Court did not rule on that particular issue.
13. Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cali.,  475 US 1 (1986), Rehnquist J.,  dissenting,
stated  that  “(e)xtension  of  the  individual  freedom  of  conscience  decisions  to  business
corporations strains the rationale of those cases beyond the breaking point. To ascribe to such
artificial entities an ‘intellect’ or ‘mind’ for freedom of conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with
reality” (emphasis added). In a way, the very existence of rules is vindicated by this attitude,
because what this view expresses is the perception that rules have been violated.
14. The following part relies mainly on Paul Ricœur’s analysis of the connection between time
and history in the elaboration of meaning and narrative as developed in Temps et récit 3: Le Temps
raconté.
15. “The Equal Protection Clause, however, was […] relegated to decades of relative desuetude
while the Due Process Clause flourished as a cornerstone in the Court’s defense of property and
liberty of contract […]. In that cause, the Fourteenth Amendment’s ‘one pervading purpose’ was
displaced. See e. g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 US 537 (1896). It was only as the era of substantive due
process came to a close […] that the Equal Protection Clause began to attain a genuine measure of
vitality.”
16. “[T]he United States had become a Nation of minorities;” “As the Nation filled with a stock of
many  lands,  the  reach  of  the  Clause  was  gradually  extended  to  all  ethnic  groups  seeking
protection from official discrimination.”
17. “Each [minority] had to struggle […] to overcome the prejudices not of a monolithic majority,
but of a 'majority' composed of various minority groups of whom it was said—perhaps unfairly in
many cases—that a shared characteristic was a willingness to disadvantage other groups.”
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18. “The  guarantees  of  equal  protection,”  said  the  Court  in  Yick  Wo,  “are  universal  in  their
application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of
race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection
of equal laws.”
19. “There is no principled basis for deciding which groups would merit ‘heightened judicial
solicitude’ and which would not.”
20. “Those whose societal injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary level of tolerability then
would be entitled to preferential classifications at the expense of individuals belonging to other
groups. Those classifications would be free from exacting judicial scrutiny. As these preferences
began to have their desired effect, and the consequences of past discrimination were undone,
new judicial rankings would be necessary. The kind of variable sociological and political analysis
necessary to produce such rankings simply does not lie within the judicial competence—even if
they otherwise were politically feasible and socially desirable.”
21. “The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a theory
but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. The result of philosophy
is not a number of ‘philosophical propositions,’ but to make propositions clear” (Wittgenstein
1922: 77).
22. This case was about the “injurious” labeling and prohibition by the Illinois legislature of the
commerce of “filled milk” to other states for health reasons. The appellant claimed that such a
decision violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Commerce Clause. The
Court found that the legislative decision was “presumptively constitutional,” so there was no
basis for the courts to review it.
23. “There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the
first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth  […].  It  is  unnecessary  to  consider  now whether  legislation  which  restricts  those
political  processes  which  can  ordinarily  be  expected  to  bring  about  repeal  of  undesirable
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. Nor need we inquire whether
similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious […] or
national […] or racial minorities […]: whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may
be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry” (emphasis added).
24. “Ethnic diversity, however, is only one element in a range of factors a university properly
may consider in attaining the goal  of  a  heterogeneous student body” (316).  Referring to the
Harvard College program: “In such an admissions program, race or ethnic background may be
deemed a  ‘plus’  in  a  particular  applicant’s  file,  yet  it  does  not  insulate  the  individual  from
comparison  with  all  other  candidates  for  the  available  seats.  The  file  of  a  particular  black
applicant may be examined for his potential contribution to diversity without the factor of race
being decisive when compared, for example, with that of an applicant identified as an Italian-
American  if  the  latter  is  thought  to  exhibit  qualities  more  likely  to  promote  beneficial
educational pluralism. Such qualities could include exceptional personal talents, unique work or
service  experience,  leadership  potential,  maturity,  demonstrated  compassion,  a  history  of
overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate with the poor, or other qualifications deemed
important. In short, an admissions program operated in this way is flexible enough to consider
all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and
to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them
the same weight” (Powell J.).
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25. Thomas Nagel is an American philosopher, currently University Professor of Philosophy and
Law at New York University where he has taught since 1980. His main areas of philosophical
interest are philosophy of mind, political philosophy and ethics. His PhD was supervised by John
Rawls, whose theory of justice he discusses in some of his most influential books, notably The
Possibility of Altruism (1970, reprinted 1978), Equality and Partiality (1991), and in his article “John
Rawls and Affirmative Action” (Nagel 2003).
26. By which we mean the utilitarian concept, based on the calculus of average that defines the
common good. Here, Nagel uses this notion in a paradoxical manner: social utility may exist,
irrespective  of  the  sum  of  the  interests  of  the  majority.  In  fact,  the  purposive  feature  of
utilitarianism is  gauged against  different time scales:  the short  term vision of  justice,  which
states that racial preferences are overridden by merit, and long term views stating that Equal
Protection is an ongoing process that includes social equality, another facet of justice.
27. Because, contrary to what Wittgenstein had attempted to find in his Tractatus, there is no
such a thing as the essence of language.
28. This word refers to any type of human interaction and social organisation.
29. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d 474 (Cole C.J.). See also Cf. United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 US 144, 152 n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938).
30. Compare id., (“You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and
liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, ‘you are free to compete
with all the others,’ and still justly believe that you have been completely fair”), with Coalition 652
F.3d at 614.
31. “Freedom is the right to share, share fully and equally, in American society—to vote, to hold a
job, to enter a public place, to go to school. It is the right to be treated in every part of our
national life as a person equal in dignity and promise to all others.”
32. Coalition Plaintiffs Supplemental Brief On En Banc Review at 28, Coalition 652 F.3d 607 (2011)
(No. 08-1387), 2011 WL 5122713.
ABSTRACTS
The  purpose  of  this  contribution  is  to  provide  an  insight  into  the  semantics  of  the  Equal
Protection  clause  of  the  14th Amendment  to  the  US  Constitution  as  interpreted  by  the  US
Supreme Court, how it has been submitted to the vagaries of context and opinions, as the Justices
are speakers of the language of law. Legal interpretation will be approached in Part 1 via the
exploration of “grammar” and “rules” that have produced contrasted and sometimes ambiguous
results  as  expressed in the Court’s  decisions,  following Ludwig Wittgenstein’s  concept of  the
“language game.” Such a notion can be seen as the substance that shapes the identity and the
memory of groups that have been differently affected by legal decisions. Part 2 will show how the
constitutional clause is structured in relation to its meaning and its complex relation with time,
as defined by French philosopher Paul Ricœur. Conversely, claiming that society exerts some
influence on the law is equally valid. Part 3 will address the question raised by Thomas Nagel,
whether a law that gives “equal opportunities” to a group by means of “preferential treatment”
is compatible with justice.
L’objectif de cet article est d’analyser le sémantisme de la Clause d’Égale Protection du 14ème
Amendement  de  la  Constitution  des  États-Unis  selon  l’interprétation  qu’en  donne  la  Cour
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Suprême en montrant combien cette interprétation a varié selon le contexte historique et les
jugements  (opinions)  des  juges,  dépositaires  du  langage  du  droit.  La  première  partie  sera
consacrée à la manière dont l’interprétation en droit a fourni des résultats contrastés et divers
grâce à l’étude de sa « grammaire » et de ses « règles » en s’appuyant sur l'analyse du concept
wittgensteinien de « jeu de langage ». On peut voir dans cette notion l’ingrédient central qui a
forgé l’identité et la mémoire collective de groupes d’individus affectés de différentes façons par
les décisions de justice en matière d’égale protection. La deuxième partie s’attachera à montrer
que  le  sens  de  la  clause  constitutionnelle  est  intimement  lié  aux  différentes  perceptions
subjectives du temps et de la mémoire historiques, tels que ces notions sont définies par Paul
Ricœur. A l’inverse, il est tout aussi vrai que la société exerce une très forte influence sur le droit
et  la  loi.  C’est  ainsi  que  la  troisième partie  tentera  de  répondre  à  la  question, soulevée  par
Thomas Nagel, de savoir si des mesures de « discrimination positive » sont compatibles avec la
notion de justice.
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